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SUPREME LAW OR BASIC LAW?
THE DECLINE OF THE CONCEPT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
Rett R. Ludwikowski*
The relationship between international law and domestic law
has been widely but still not exhaustively examined in existing
American legal writings. The discussion was traditionally focused
on the United States doctrine of international law. It centered on
the confrontation of monistic and dualistic viewpoints on Ameri-
can soil' and examined the role of the main components of interna-
tional law as they relate to domestic statutory construction.2
However, it ought to be clearly recognized that the growing pres-
ence of international legal elements in the domestic law also im-
pacts the position of the constitution itself. The extent to which the
process of internationalization of domestic law has affected the
concept of the constitution as the supreme law warrants examina-
tion in the United States and even more so in the countries that
have adopted constitutions within the last century.
This article explores the process of the decline of the concept
of constitutional supremacy. It highlights that the concept of the
constitution as the law highest in rank was historically rooted in the
premises of the traditional theory of dualism. This theory assumed
that both municipal and international legal systems are separate
and as such may have different supreme laws, ultimate and highest
in authority. In fact, however, the current fabric of the global legal
system is not monistic or dualistic but rather multi-focal. The
Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America.
1 See Myres S. McDougal, The Impact of International Law Upon National Law: A
Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 S.D. L. Rv. 25 (1959); J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in
the Theory of International Law, 17 BRrr.Y.B. INTL. 66 (1936); Edwin Borchard, The Rela-
tion Between International Law and Municipal Law, 27 VA. L. Rnv. 137 (1940); Curtis A.
Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive
Role of International Law [hereinafter The Charming Betsy Canon], 86 GEo. L. J. 479
(1998); Mark W. Janis, International Law and Municipal Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW, (3rd ed. 1999); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS THE LAW
OF THE UNrTED STATES, (1996).
2 See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a Canon of Domestic
Statutory Construction, 433 VAND. L. REv. 1103 (1990).
3 For an analysis of the confrontation of "internationalist " and traditional "dualist"
approach to international law, see Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and
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globalization of law mooted the classical dispute between monistic
and dualistic schools. The national, supranational, international,
and regional legal structures overlap and penetrate each other,
leaving no room for the concept of clear-cut supremacy of one sin-
gle set of legal norms over all others. The death of the doctrine of
absolute sovereignty and immunity of a state and the emergence of
the supranational organizations guided the states into the web of
links and obligations that resulted in a gradual decline of the con-
cept of the constitutional supremacy.
Even in the United States, not the Constitution alone but the
Constitution and the other laws, including components of interna-
tional law, act as the supreme law of the land. The drafters of
other recently adopted constitutions display an even more distinct
tendency to treat constitutions as basic not supreme law. This arti-
cle reviews the process of progressive abatement of the once
heated dispute between the monists and dualists and examines the
evolving position of and the roles played by the recently adopted
constitutions. Particular focus is paid to the constitution-making
process in Eastern and Central Europe and the relationship of con-
stitutional law of the European Community to national law of its
member states. No attempt is made to extend this analysis to the
rest of the world.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MONISM AND DUALISM.
Traditional monism maintained that there was only a single
legal order in which all norms, municipal and international, existed
in harmony. Some representatives of this school claimed that the
universal legal system existed as a hierarchy in which the national
law derived its validity from the superior international law. Other
representatives claimed that the domestic law occupied a higher
rank than international law.4 More moderate proponents of mon-
ism emphasized harmony and coherence rather than hierarchy of
the Internationalist Conception [hereinafter Breard], 51 STAN. L. REv. 529 (1999). The
term dualism has been sometimes used interchangeably with pluralism. However, the legal
world of the dualists was bipolar and pluralism, in the meaning used in this article, signifies
the multipolar structure of the world legal system. See also J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 81-82 (8th ed. 1977).
4 See Steinardt, supra note 2, atll04; H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
553-88 (2nd ed. 1966); J. STARKE, AN INTRODuCrION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-90 (6th
ed. 1967).
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the norms and argued that domestic and international elements of
this universal order penetrate each other.5
The dualists, the school opposing legal monism, maintained
that national and municipal law were substantially different and ex-
isted separately.6 The fundamental difference between these two
systems stemmed from the fact that the rules and norms of interna-
tional law grew out of custom while the main components of the
municipal law evolved from legislation. Dualists claimed not only
that the sources but also the subjects of both legal systems are dif-
ferent: while the municipal law regulates the relationship between
the state and individuals and between individuals themselves, inter-
national law is limited to the regulation of relations between states.
Extreme dualists even argued that international law was not law
but only a system of international morality.7 While the moderate
monists believed that rules are transferred from international law
to domestic law and vice versa through "assimilation" or "transfor-
mation," the moderate dualists insisted that the process of incorpo-
ration required "recognition" of the validity of international
norms. This process transforms the rules of international law into
ipso facto norms of municipal law.8 H. Kelsen eloquently ex-
pressed this notion:
If it is assumed that international law is valid for a State without
any recognition on the part of this State, then the norm in ques-
tion is but a general transformation of international into na-
tional law prescribed by this particular constitution. If,
however, it is assumed that international law is valid for a State
only if "recognized" by this State, the norm in question is con-
sidered to be "recognition" of international by national law.
According to the first theory, international law is a legal
order superior to all the national legal orders which, as inferior
legal orders, are "delegated" by the international legal order,
and form, together with the latter one universal legal order. Ac-
cording to the second theory, the national legal order is superior
5 For the comments on so-called "municipal law school of monism" see Borchard,
supra note 1, at 138.
6 See LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTRODUCTION TO PIccIoTro, RELATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAWv TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 10 (1915).
7 JOHN AusTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 184 (5th ed. 1885). For further discussion of this po-
sition see McDougal, supra note 1, at 18.
8 See OPPENmIM, supra note 6.
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to the international legal order, which received its validity from
the former.9
The monistic viewpoint had its foundations in the ancient and
medieval philosophical conception of the world's single, harmoni-
ous, and hierarchically organized legal system. In ancient Judaism,
the law directly communicated to the people by Yahweh could be
only one and universal.1" The assumption that God was the source
of justice resulted in rejection of the relativistic claim that the same
act may be "just" in one forum and "unjust" in another.
The opinion that the law, being rooted in the concept of jus-
tice, had to both one and universal, was also overwhelmingly pre-
sent in the ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. For Plato and
his followers, the law was a reproduction of the idea of justice; for
Cicero and the stoics, the law represented precepts of reason em-
bedded in nature." Nature was created by God and organized har-
moniously accordingly to laws that had universal validity. In the
area of human law, both the rules regulating the activities within
the communities and between communities themselves were ex-
pressions of God's will.' The states (civitates) were implementing
the principles of the law in the norms of jus gentium, common to all
political entities. 3 As Roman jurist Gaius wrote in his "Institutes":
All nations, which are governed by statutes and customs,
make use partly of law, which is peculiar to the respective na-
tions, and partly of such as is common to mankind. Whatever
law any nation has established for itself is peculiar to the partic-
ular state (civitas), and is called civil law (jus civile), as being the
peculiar law of that state, but law which natural reason has laid
down for mankind in general is maintained equally by all men,
and is called jus gentium, as being the law which all nations
use.
14
The process of Christianization of the Roman Empire and the
development of the doctrine of caesaropapism 5 strengthened the
9 H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 382 (1945).
10 CARL J. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 8-12
(2 nd ed. 1963).
11 Id. at 28-29.
12 See KELSEN, supra note 9, at 8.
13 FRIEDRICH, supra note 10, at 34.
14 Gains, Institutes, in JAMES L. WISER, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A HISTORY OF
SEARCH FOR ORDER 79-80 (1983).
15 According to the doctrine of caesaropapism, developed in the Byzantine Empire in
the last centuries of the first Christian millennium, the emperors were deemed to have
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concept of legal universalism. The emperors' ecclesiastical func-
tions seemed to emphasize the harmony between earthly and spiri-
tual powers and legitimized the emperors' functions as single
lawmakers.'
6
At the time of fragmentation of medieval Christianity, the
concept of the hierarchically organized universal legal order got its
strongest support in Thomas Aquinas's doctrine. His legal uni-
verse with lex aeterna, understood as God's original creative plan,
with lex naturalis as the imprint of eternal God's intention in
human minds, and lex humana (man-made law) as the implementa-
tion of the general principles of natural God's wisdom, created an
intellectual framework for future development of monism.
17
Since the inception of the Holy Roman Empire, the doctrine
of the legal order, embedded in the naturalistic philosophy, pre-
vailed but the concept of its uniformly pyramidal structure faced
some challenges. Developed in the Western (Latin) Roman Em-
pire as an alternative to Byzantine caesaropapism, the doctrine of
"the two swords" claimed that Christ himself divided power be-
tween political and spiritual rulers. Left to politics were the dis-
tinctive functions in the area of purely human affairs; left to the
spiritual rulers was the authority to interpret the laws protecting
eternal values.' Spiritual and political leaders of the world supple-
mented each other's visions but their domains were separate and
their orders were arranged in two different pyramids.
The next breach in the religiously oriented philosophy of natu-
ral law was the Humanist jurisprudence of the fifteenth and six-
teenth Centuries.' 9 Without challenging the naturalistic fabric of
the law, the Humanist jurists placed emphasis on man-made law.
The legal order was natural for them not because it was the reflec-
tion of God's intentions but because it was suitable for all men. As
assumed roles of God's regents and as such had both spiritual and political powers. See
HARRY MAGOULIAS, BYZANTINE CHmsrIANTY: EMPEROR, CHURCH AND THE WEST 8
(1970).
16 See Id. at 105-106.
17 See JAMES L. vISER, POLITCAL PmLoSOPHY: A HISTORY OF SEARCH FOR ORDER
122-23 (1983); see also ANTHONY J. LIssKcA, AQUINA'S THEORY OF NATURAL LAW 82-115
(1996).
18 Id. at 106-107; see also FRANCIS DvoRNIK, EARLY CHRISTIANS AND BYZANTINE Po-
LMCAL PHILOSOPHY: ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND 807(1966).
19 Leading scholars of this movement are usually recognized to be: Guillaume Bude
(1468-1540), Andrea Alciati (1492-1550), Ultrich Zasi (1461-1535), Jackues Cujas (1522-
90). See FRIEDRICH, supra note 10, at 51-56.
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Carl Friedrich wrote, "the older Christian natural law was about to
be replaced by a secular and philosophical natural law." 20
The gradual laicization of the theory of law laid the founda-
tions for the development of legal dualism. In the sixteenth cen-
tury, this process became most visible in the political philosophy of
Jean Bodin (1530-96). Famed as the founding father of the doc-
trine of sovereignty, Bodin retained in his political writings a natu-
ralistic rhetoric typical of medieval political philosophy.
Accordingly to Bodin, the government of a republic ought to be
based on the laws of nature and the sovereign was not expected to
violate any of these natural laws 1.2  However, statutory law, not
natural law is at the center of Bodin's legal system. Bodin wrote,
"[s]overeignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a republic"
22
and the most important function of the sovereign was to legislate.
The sovereign had the right to decide what was the highest law for
his subjects and if the sovereignty was to signify absolute power
this right could not be conditional. Bodin concludes, "[h]e who
contemns his sovereign prince, contemns God whose image he
is."
23
Bodin's world became strikingly bipolar. The relationships of
the sovereign with God were detached from the relationships with
his subjects. The sovereign was responsible for violations of natu-
ral law, beyond this his domestic orders could not be evaluated or
questioned. The republic was building its own pyramid of legal
norms, closed and impenetrable from the outside. Bodin did not
come to any fully expressed dualistic or pluralistic conclusions but
his doctrine of sovereignty included some future components of
dualism. As Hans Kelsen wrote,
The most important consequence of the theory, which proceeds
from the primacy of national law, is that the State whose legal
order is the starting point of the whole construction can be con-
sidered to be sovereign. For the legal order of this State is pre-
supposed to be supreme order, above which no other legal order
exists. This is also a consequence of the pluralistic theory.24
20 Id. at 56.
21 Id. at 57.
22 Id.
23 J. BODIN, Six BooKs OF THE COMMONWEALTH (abridged and translated by M.J.
Tooley) 40 (1967).
24 KELSEN, supra note 9, at 383. Kelsen uses interchangeably terms dualism and plural-
ism to emphasize that besides the international legal system a large number of domestic
systems is involved.
[Vol. 9:253
SUPREME LAW OR BASIC LAW?
It was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) who, in the seventeenth
century, supplemented Bodin's theory with several arguments serv-
ing to establish the legitimacy of the sovereigns' rule. He started
with the examination of unique features of passionate human na-
ture and concluded that chaotic and clashing human desires cannot
be organized, channeled and controlled without the peoples' con-
sent to give absolute power to the ruler. Although the foundation
of the sovereign authority was consented to, the social contract ele-
vated the sovereign above the law and made him independent of
any external authorities.2 Describing the scope of the power of
the sovereign, Hobbes wrote:
it is annexed to the sovereignty, to be judge of what opinions
and doctrines are averse,.. .the whole power of prescribing the
rules ... the right of making war and peace with other nations,
and commonwealths ... the choosing of all counselors, minis-
ters, magistrates, and officers, both in peace and war ... the
power of rewarding with riches, or honors; and of punishing
with corporal, or pecuniary punishment
26
The emergence of the theory of sovereignty inevitably had to
raise an issue of mutual relations between the sovereign states.
The most systematic presentation of the rules governing the foreign
relations of the nations, offered by Dutch jurist Grotius (Hugo de
Groot, 1583-1645), provided the spark that facilitated the process
of growth of the body of international law. Grotius' philosophy,
strongly influenced by stoicism, was not yet dualistic. Recognizing
the rights of newly emerging national states, Grotius warned that
sovereignty couldn't result in international anarchy. He claimed
that before the political entities emerged, existing laws of reason
and nature, being the foundation of international law, would be
binding on all sovereigns.27
As Hans Kelsen correctly observed, Grotius' naturalistic con-
cepts of international conflicts, legitimized only by just causes (bel-
lum justum)28 remained predominant until the end of the
eighteenth century.29 Gradually the political writers became more
focused on human legislative activities and the rights of the states
25 WISER, supra note 17, at 194.
26 LEVIATHAN, CH. 18 in MICHAEL L. MORTON, CLASSICS OF MORAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY 642-45 (1992).
27 FRIEDRICH, supra note 10, at 66.
28 See GROTIuS, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS (1625).
29 KELSEN, supra note 6, at 336
2001] 259
260 CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW
than on the restraints imposed on the sovereigns by international
morality. At the end of the eighteenth century, the rules of nature
were criticized as being vague, a notion most eloquently expressed
by David Hume (1711-1776). As J.L. Wiser wrote, "According to
Hume, inasmuch as the mind cannot know nature, it is at the same
time incapable of knowing what is naturally right or what is natu-
rally just.
'30
The concept of states' equality, developed by Emer Vatell
(1714-67) in The Law of Nations, (published in 1758), 3' was the
logical conclusion drawn from the initial assumption that states,
similarly as people in the state of nature, are free and have the
same rights; absolute and sovereign power of the most powerful
political entity was to be equal to that of a small republic. 32 Vattel
maintained that no state has right to impose any pressure or med-
dle with the internal affairs of another state. Along that same line
Christian Wolff (1679-1754) wrote that "to interfere in the govern-
ment of another, in whatever way indeed that may be done, is op-
posed to the natural liberty of nations, by virtue of which one is
altogether independent of the will of other nations in its action"
33
In the nineteenth century, the theory fundamental for foster-
ing dualism claimed that the domestic law of a sovereign state is an
impenetrable domain. This theory has received strong political
support in the emergence of the tightly organized and centralized
nation-state 34 and philosophical enhancement from the legal posi-
tivism and the analytical philosophy of law. Positivism, as con-
trasted with natural-law theory, renounced absolute justification of
law as flowing from nature, God, reason or the possibility of satis-
fying common human needs. The rules of positive law were de-
rived from the arbitrary will of political authorities. The law was
understood as an order, an expression of the will of the legislator
or the ruler. As John Austin (1790-1859) wrote, "[e]very law or
30 WISER, supra note 17, at 290.
31 EMMERICH DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DES GENS (translated as The Law of Nations) (1st
American ed. 1796).
32 VATIEL (DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LALOI NATURELLE APPLIQUES A LA
CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVEAINS (1758); see also STEPHEN
D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 14 (1999).
33 Quoted in Krasner supra note 32, and ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS THOMAS & A.J.
THOMAS, JR., NON-ITERVENTON: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 5 (1956).
34 See Harry G. Gelber, Background: The Growth of the Nation-State, in SOVEREIGNTY
THROUGH INTERDEPENDENCE 1-32 ( 1997).
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rule ... is a command. Or, rather laws or rules, properly so called,
are a species of commands.
35
Analytical jurisprudence, represented by Austin and many of
his followers, did not go beyond the examination of the positive
law or what allowed the sovereign to issue concrete commands.
The coherence of the statutes and other decisions of the sovereign
were to be analyzed, not their quality of serving justice. As Isaak
Husik wrote,
The business of the analytical jurist is to expound in a sys-
tematic and scientific way what it has actually pleased the sover-
eign to command his subjects or citizens ... [T]he law itself
cannot be according to law or against the law, hence the law
itself is neither just or unjust, neither right nor wrong.
36
The courts' decisions in the nineteenth century widely con-
firmed that states were independent and fully immune from judi-
cial process in other countries. As the French Supreme Court
stated in 1848 in Government v. Lambege et Pujol:
The reciprocal independence of states is one of the most univer-
sally respected principles of international law, and it follows as a
result therefrom that a government cannot be subjected to the
jurisdiction of another against its will, and that the right of juris-
diction of one government over litigation arising from its own
acts is a right inherent to its sovereignty that another govern-
ment cannot seize without impairing their mutual relations.3 7
The court in Great Britain pronounced the same doctrine in The
Parlement Beige, decided in 1880. The court stated:
As a consequence of the absolute independence of every sover-
eign authority, and of the international comity which induces
every sovereign state to respect the independence and dignity of
every sovereign state, each and every one declines to exercise by
means of its courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the per-
son of any sovereign
38
35 JoH-Nr AUSTIN, LEcruREs ON JURISPRUDENCE 88 (5th ed. 1885).
36 I.Husik, Introduction to RUDOLF STANSMER's Tim THEORY OF JUSTICE Xviii-xLx
(1925).
37 Quoted in JOSEPH M. SwaENEY, Tim INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIoN IIMMU-
NiTY (DEP'T ST PUi 1963) at 20-21.
38 Id. For the position taken by the courts in US see traditionally quoted case, The
Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The US Executive Branch generally
supported the concept of absolute immunity until 1952. See BARRY E. CARTER, PBILIP R.
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 551 (1991).
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At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the phil-
osophical framework was well prepared for the heated dispute be-
tween the monists and dualists. The dualist viewpoint was gaining
ground in Germany and Italy where it was closely associated with
such scholars as Heinrich Triepel and D. Anzilotti. 39 The monistic
position was strongly supported by Hans Kelsen of the Vienna
School of jurisprudence; in the United Kingdom, Hersch Lauter-
pacht became an outspoken promoter of this doctrine.4 °
II. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION. DECLINE OF DUALISM.
In the twentieth century, the monistic approach seemed to
prevail in international legal scholarship, while dualist concepts,
recognized as more precise and less confusing, were still applied by
the domestic courts of a great number of states. As Mark W. Janis
stated,
Whatever the logical attractions of monism, it is not usually as
reliable a guide to practice as dualism. Most states and most
courts, including those in the United States, presumptively view
national and international legal systems as discrete entities and
routinely discuss in a dualist fashion the incorporation of rules
from one system to the other.4'
On international ground, the sixteenth century theory of abso-
lute sovereignty, which traditionally enhanced the dualistic view-
point, was subject to the most serious challenge. It soon became
obvious that the fortress-like concept of a state was obsolete. The
domestic authorities' sole right to control the territory of the state
and the judge legitimacy of the citizens' behavior was gradually
eroded and the division between international and domestic law
was no longer as sharp.
In practice, political sovereignty was called into question by
almost routine interventions into the domestic affairs of a great
number of states.42 The right to limited intervention was used and
misused in the interest of national groups, ethnic minorities and
individuals. It was often claimed that the concept of absolute
equality and independence of sovereign entities was a scholastic
39 See Sasse, The Common Market: Between International and Municipal Law, 75 YALE
L.J. 712-713 (1963).
40 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 33-35 (2nd ed. 1973).
41 M. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (3rd ed. 1999).
42 Krasner, supra note32, at 28; see also ANN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., The Era of
Intervention in the Americas, in THOMAS & THOMAS, JR., supra note 33, at 15-54.
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dogma and was not even expressly represented by authorities such
as Bodin, Vattel or Grotius.
43
It also has often been maintained that sovereignty has several
components that ought to be sharply distinguished. Stephen D.
Krasner has most eloquently presented the development of this
multi-focal concept of sovereignty. He wrote:
The term sovereignty has been used in four different ways-in-
ternational legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic
sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty. International le-
gal sovereignty refers to the practices associated with mutual
recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal
juridical independence. Westhalian sovereignty refers to politi-
cal organization based on the exclusion of external actors from
authority structures within a given territory. Domestic sover-
eignty refers to the formal organization of political authority
within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise
effective control within the borders of their own polity. Finally,
interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of public au-
thorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, peo-
ple, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state.'
The idea that sovereignty has several elements triggered the
observation that a state might be sovereign, but with limitations.
The state authorities might lose internal control over domestic af-
fairs, but the state might still be internationally recognized and not
subject to any sort of external pressure. The regimes might not be
recognized by other states but might still have full control over
some territories and population. On the other hand, fully recog-
nized states, in control of their internal affairs, might be subject to
foreign economic, political or military intervention. The assump-
tion that the lack of some of these elements may not necessarily
undermine the validity of the whole concept of sovereignty facili-
tated the development of the theory of limited sovereignty.
The courts in the twentieth century were also determined to
reexamine the old fashioned doctrine of states' absolute immunity.
As the Supreme Court of Belgium stated in 1903, "[s]overeignty is
43 Bodin did not dismiss the limitations of the sovereign by natural law and private
obligations for the sobordinates; Vattel, who often was recognized as the father of the
theory of nonintervention, himself spoke in favor of the intervention for humanitarian rea-
sons; Grotius was himself an eloquent defender of the concept of bellum justum. See ANN
VAN WYNEN THoMAs & A.J. THoAs, JR., supra note 33, at 4-7.
44 KRASNER, supra note 32, at 3-4.
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involved only when political acts are accomplished by the state. 45
Commercial activity and other acts by state authorities of semi-pri-
vate character were left outside the scope of the concept of restric-
tive immunity. It was recognized that the states' agencies might
buy, sell, employ people and be responsible for injuries caused to
private persons in the same way that individuals or private compa-
nies can be held liable. The armor of the theory of absolute immu-
nity that was pierced by some European courts in the early
twentieth century was finely broken in the United States by the
famous letter of the acting legal adviser for the Secretary of State,
Jack B. Tate. He proclaimed that a number of states, such as the
U.S., Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Poland and to some
extent Brazil, Chile, China, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway
and Portugal supported the classic theory of immunity. The courts
in other countries were neither clear nor consistent in their deci-
sions. Suggesting changes in the United States approach, Tate con-
cluded that:
it should be observed that in most of the countries still fol-
lowing the classical theory there is a school of influential writers
favoring the restrictive theory and the views of writers, at least
in civil law countries, are a major factor in the development of
the law. Moreover, the leanings of the lower courts in civil law
countries are more significant in shaping the law than they are in
common law countries where the rule of precedent prevails and
the trend in these lower courts is to the restrictive theory. 46
World War II brought not only the abundant evidence of empirical
violations of the states' sovereign rights but proved that the rulers'
control over states' territory and population might be subject to
evaluation based on internationally accepted criteria. Regardless
of the theoretical assumptions that sovereign governments are not
capable of international legal limitations,47 the post-war era proved
that most states habitually observe the rules of international law
and those who do not might be forced to accept judgments of the
international community. The conclusion of the war confirmed
that individual activities were subject to the regulation of interna-
tional law and that national decision-makers could not hide behind
their superiors' orders or behind the concept of superiority of mu-
45 Societe Anonyme des Chemins de Fer Liegois Luxembourgeois v the Netherlands,
quoted in SWEENEY, supra note 37.
46 Reprinted in CARTER, supra note 38, at 555-558.
47 See Fisher, Bringing Law to Bear on Governments, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1130 (1961).
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nicipal legal systems. The existence of peremptory norms of gen-
eral international law (jus cogens) "from which no derogation is
permitted" is clearly defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties. 48 Empirically the nations could disregard the rules set
up by the international community, but the Nuremberg era proved
that international law is real and its norms are binding.49
The conclusion of World War II also triggered the develop-
ment of the contemporary human rights movement. Protection,
promotion and codification of human rights, according to interna-
tional standards, became one of the most important concerns of the
new international structures.5 ° International conventions, a major
development of the twentieth century, created the huge body of
human rights obligations for the states that altered the scope of
domestic authorities' power. The numerous human rights organi-
zations monitoring violations began interfering in domestic poli-
cies, publishing periodic reports, comparing states' records on
human rights protection and bringing the states and the decision-
makers to international courts, alleging human rights abuses.51
The post-war conventions uniformly confirmed the principle
of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states.5 2 As
Louis Henkin wrote, "[p]rohibitions of intervention and interfer-
ence, it should be clear, are part of the quest for an ideal of equally
sovereign and independent nations."53 Theoretically, the doctrine
of non-intervention was not supposed to collide with the right of
the Security Council to undertake actions with respect to threats to
peace, breaches of the peace and actions of aggression,54 regional
operations that do not involve enforcement action,55 and measures
taken by the nations exercising their rights of collective and indi-
48 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), art 53. See R. Ago, The Law of
Treaties in Light of the Vienna Convention, 134 HAGuE REcummi 297, 324 n.37 (1971-HI);
Marjorie Whitman, Jus Cogen in International Law, with a Projected List, 7 GA. J. INT'L &
Copn,.L. 609, 625-626, (1977).
49 See J. BRERLY, THi OUTLOOK OF INTERNATiONAL LAW 5 (1944) ("States may often
violate international law, just as individuals often violate municipal law; but no more than
individuals do states defend their violations by claiming that they are above the law.").
50 FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS 1-
17(1990).
51 See KRAsNER, supra note 32, at 30-33.
52 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2/4; art. VI, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope, Final Act; art 20, Charter of the Organization of American States.
53 L. HENKiN, How NATIONS BEHAvE, 153-54 (2nd ed. 1979).
54 U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
55 U.N. CHARTER art. 53.
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vidual self-defense. 56 Practically, however, the theory of self-de-
fense seemed like an inflatable balloon that was engulfing the
concepts of anticipatory self-defense,57 preemptive strikes,58 and
the right to defend allies and nationals beyond the states' borders.
In time, the states also began claiming the right to defend human
rights wherever they were violated, and the right to intervene into
the civil strife that became internationalized. The concept of
peacekeeping actions and humanitarian interventions denied the
sovereign states' authority to violate the liberties and rights of hu-
manity beyond the limits of justice and reason tolerable for the
international community.5 9 Although these theories have never
been fully acknowledged as a part of international law,6" they be-
gan to undermine the once untouched bastion of a states' right to
control all domestic problems.61
The protection of international human rights contributed to
general recognition that there are values that transcend national
interests. The notion that there are goals and values common to all
people, such as protection of environment, human rights protec-
tion, global security and many others, grew out of the discussions
about new world order and triggered the trend toward globaliza-
56 U.N. CHARTER .art. 51; Department of State Memorandum on Legal Basis for the
quarantine of Cuba, prepared by Office of Legal Advisor, Dep. of State (Oct. 23, 1962). See
also William W. Bishop, Jr., Lawfulness of Use of Force, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, 912-47
(3rd ed. 1962).
57 See DEREK BowEr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 87-90 (1958); See also
McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quaranteine and Self-defence, 57 AM.J.INr.L. 597, 599-601
(1963).
58 See Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqui Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 584 (1983); Open Forum: Israel's Air Strike against the Osiraq Reactor: A Retro-
spective, 10 TEMP. INT'L & CoMp L.J. 259; The Israeli Air Strike, 1981: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97' Cong. 1S Sess. 85088 (1981); Stephen J. Solarz,
Israel Had No Other Way to End Nuclear Threat, Wash Star June 11, 1981; Louis Rene
Beres & Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel's Destruction of Iraq Nuclear Reactor,
9 TEMPLE INT'L &CoMP. L.J. 437 (1995).
59 See Schwelb., HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, (1964); Lilich, In-
tervention to Protect Human Rights, 205 McGILL L.J. (1969); D'Amato, Invasion of Pan-
ama was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM J.INT'L L. 516 (1990).
60 For a different position, see BowETr, supra note 57, (noting that humanitarian inter-
vention had been lawful before the UN Charter and remained lawful thereafter). Compare
I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES, 301 (1963).
61 See Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention:A Reply to Dr Brownlie and a Plea for Con-
structive Alternatives, in J. MOORE, LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD, 229,
247-48 (1974).
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tion of the law.62 Global institutions, established to sponsor inter-
national or supranational cooperative activities, began codifying
the rules of fair trade, prescribing environmental and health stan-
dards and extending financial resources contingent on the borrow-
ers' adjustments of their domestic politics. 63 As Stephen Krasner
wrote:
Over time the conditions imposed by agencies such as the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have become
more explicitly political-for instance, insisting on the establish-
ment of independent commissions to attack corruption. This
trend accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which
left weaker borrowing states with no alternative to the West,
something that some of them welcomed, such as the former
Communist countries of Eastern Europe, and others did not.
The last international financial institution to be established, the
European Bank for the Reconstruction and Development, made
commitment to democracy a condition of membership. Borrow-
ers have accepted these terms because they are better off with
the money and with some loss of autonomy than without the
money and a higher level of autonomy. Finally, the European
Union, with its panoply of supranational institutions, is a clear
example of a voluntary contractual arrangement that contradicts
Westphalian sovereignty.'
From the international community's perspective, the superiority of
international legal order over domestic law seemed to be less ques-
tionable than ever. The states could disregard or violate interna-
tional obligations and rules but they could not appeal to their
domestic regulations to justify such conduct.65  The Permanent
Court of International Justice pronounced this principle in the
Greco-Bulgarian Communities case and in an Advisory Opinion on
the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations.66 It was clearly
62 See M. Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets. Implications for
Domestic Law Reform, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUr. 37-64 (vol. 1/nr 1 1993); See also
TOWARD A JUST WORLD ORDER (R.A. Falk, S.S. Kim, and S.H. Mendlovitz eds., 1982); M.
GURTOV, GLOBAL POLITICS IN TE HuMAN INTEREST, (1988); M.McDOUGAL, HI LASS-
WELL, L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTs AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, (1980).
63 See Gelber, supra note 34, at 173-92 (providing an extensive examination of the in-
creasing interdependence of the domestic economy with the external world). Gelber
claims that "economic interdependence had grown steadily between World War II and the
1970's."
64 See KRAsNER, supra note 32, at 226.
65 See statement of Secretary Bayard, quoted in M.S. McDougal, The Impact of Interna-
tional Law Upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 S.D. L.REv. 59 (1959).
66 1930 P.C.I.J. Reports, Ser. B. No 17, at 32 and Ser. B. No 10 (1925) at 20.
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confirmed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties
that stated that "a party may not invoke the provisions of its inter-
nal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.
'67
In a domestic forum, the supreme laws of the country could
still prevail in a conflict with international law; internationally,
however, even the violation of constitutional norms could not re-
lease the states from international obligations. Within the uniform
and hierarchically constructed legal system, the supreme laws al-
ways take precedence over all other inferior laws. From the per-
spective of an increasingly monistic doctrine of international law,
this assumption leads to a logical conclusion: if the states could
neither claim the right to violate international obligations nor to
adopt the laws that would violate general principles of customary
international law or norms jus cogens, they cannot claim that their
laws are supreme. The concept of supremacy of the components of
the municipal legal system that are bound to yield to another
(namely international law) is logically inconsistent. The question
remains whether the idea of constitutional supremacy is still de-
fendable even in a municipal forum.
III. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION - BASIC OR
SUPERIOR COMPONENT OF THE SUPREME
LAW OF THE LAND?
The relationship between U.S. domestic laws and international
law has been exhaustively explored and does not require extensive
summarization. In the following pages, the predominant trends in
the academic discussion and judicial decisions in the United States
will be presented only to the extent that will allow conclusions re-
garding the status of the constitution within the supreme law of the
country.68
1. The basic principles, incorporated in the Supremacy Clause
of the Article VI section 2 of the Constitution, were most clearly
articulated by John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.69 Most of
Marshall's "logic" still remains untouched.70 He wrote:
67 Entered into force on Jan 27, 1960, art. 27; see also art. 46.
68 See supra note 1, for the selected literature on the topic.
69 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (1803).
70 See Carlos S. Nino, A Philosophical Reconstruction of Judicial Review, 14 C~ARozo
L. REv. 799-804, (1993) (criticizing Marshall's logic).
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This is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the con-
stitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the
legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The con-
stitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary the legislative
acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall
please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative is true, then a legisla-
tive act contrary to the Constitution is not law, if the latter part
be true then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the
part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature
illimitable.7 '
The conclusion that the Constitution is the "Supreme Law of
the Land" to which all other legislative sources are subject7 2 seems
to be unquestionable. The statement that the people's power is
"illimitable" has at the least been debatable and the relationship
between two components of the "Supreme Law," other than the
Constitution, namely, treaties and federal statutes, was not clearly
explained by the Constitution and was subject to extensive judicial
interpretation.
2. The post-Nuremberg era paved the way for discussing the
limits of constitutional power of the people. A legitimate question
became whether the people in any country of the world have a
right to adopt laws that would violate the natural law or the law of
nations. As Professor Jules Lobel convincingly argued, the idea
that people have to recognize restraints imposed on their power,
was not alien to the members of the U.S. Constitutional Conven-
tion. Lobel wrote:
The theorist who most fully grasped and developed the funda-
mental principle of popular sovereignty underlying the Constitu-
tion was James Wilson of Pennsylvania, a key figure at the
Constitutional Convention and at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention. Wilson viewed constitutional limitations as supple-
mental to natural law controls on legislative authority. He rec-
ognized that the people could not grant the government the
power to violate natural law, which did not derive from popular
consent. Wilson understood that although supreme power re-
7' Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
72 See E. Allan Farnsworth, INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UrNTED
STATES, 61 (3rd ed. 1996)
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sided with the people in a free society, a constitution could not
confer any right to violate international law:
"When I say that, in free states, the law of nations is the law of
the people; I mean that as the law of nature, it is indispensably
binding upon the people, in whom the sovereign power resides;
and who are, consequently, under the most sacred obligations to
exercise that power, or to delegate it to such as will exercise it,
in a manner agreeable to those rules and maxims, which the law
of nature prescribes to every state.,
73
Although, in fact, the Constitution does not expresis verbis
prohibit the President or the Congress from violating international
law, the arguments articulated above clearly support a monistic in-
terpretation of the Constitution. If the people themselves were
limited in their power, the people's representatives could not be
free from the same restraints.
The U.S. courts frequently departed from this position and ei-
ther followed the Executive's claims that the constitutional re-
straints on federal government do not apply in the area of foreign
affairs74 or ruled that limitations imposed on federal powers by in-
ternational law are nonjusticiable political questions.7 The dual-
istic approach of the courts has been criticized by numerous
commentators who claim that the President himself cannot violate
the intent of the constitutional drafters to observe the rules of in-
ternational law;76 others went on and argued that even the support
of Congress cannot relieve the federal government from the obliga-
tions imposed by the peremptory norms of international law and
human rights treaties.77
73 Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy
and International Law, 71 VA L. REv. 1091-92 (1985), (footnotes omitted); see also C.
SMITH, JAMES WILSON, FOUNDING FATHER 1742-1798, at 280, 341 (1956); G. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF AMERICAN REPUBLIC, at 530-31 (1969)
74 Bradley, Breard, supra note 3.
75 Curtis A. Bradley refers to this position as "foreign affairs exceptionalism." Id.; see
also Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390
(1998). For more extensive analysis of the judiciary decisions, see Jordan J. Paust, Is the
President Bound by the Supreme Law of the Land?-Foreign Affairs and National Security
Reexamined, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 719-720 (1982); see also Lobel, supra note 73. On
the other hand, courts also showed a tendency to take a narrow view of the circumstances
in which the Executive may exercise extraordinary powers in the situations justified by
national security. See Morton Halperin v. H. Kissinger, 196 U.S. App.D.C. 285; 606 F.2d
1192, 1201.
76 See Paust, supra note 75, at 726-27.
77 See Lobel, supra note 73; see also Bradley, Breard, supra note 3, at 529.
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3. The relationship between treaties and federal statutes was
even more uncertain than the restraints imposed by international
law on the federal government. First of all, the Constitution does
not explicitly mention international agreements other than treaties.
Although Congress was not consistent in distinguishing between
Article Il treaties and other forms of international agreements,
78
the courts assumed that self-executing agreements concluded by
the President, with authorization of the Congress, and agreements
implemented by a federal statute should be given the supreme law
status, prevailing over State law.79
Secondly, the Constitution itself does not resolve the problem
of potential conflicts between international agreements and stat-
utes. It did however render these two components of the Supreme
Law equal authority, a step that led the courts to the initial as-
sumption that in case of conflict the later in time should prevail.8 0
The doctrine of lex posterior derogat legi priori"' was, nevertheless,
applied with some reservations. The courts ruled that the principle
"later in time" does not apply in the case of conflict between sole
presidential agreements and federal statutes.' The courts also as-
sumed that the domestic law is not supposed to violate interna-
tional obligations of states and, in the case of a conflict between a
statute and an earlier treaty, judges are expected not to construe
the Acts of Congress as violating the law of nations, if another in-
terpretation is possible. Although the presumption of compliance
of domestic law with international law, known as the Charming
Betsy's principle, apparently confirmed the growing tendency to
recognize the primacy of international components of the domestic
legal system. The courts, however, interpreted the Charming Betsy
78 The Supreme Court confirmed this in Wenberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25; 102 S.Ct.
1510, 1515 (1982).
79 The Supreme Court construed "treaty" to include international agreements con-
cluded by the President with authorization of Congress. Altman & Co. v. United States,
224 U.S. 583 (1912). The Court stated, "If not technically a treaty requiring ratification,
nevertheless it was a compact authorized by the Congress of the United States, negotiated
and proclaimed under the authority of the President. We think such as compact is a
treaty." Id.
80 See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic
Statutory Construction, 43 VARN. L. REv.1105 (1990).
81 "A later law takes away the effect of a prior one."
82 See United States v Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953). For other
grounds affirming this approach, see REsTATEMrNT oiF m LAw THID, VOL I (1987)
§ 111 at 44. See also § 115 n.5.
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83canon in a dualistic way. In the cases of irreconcilable conflict,
the domestic law still prevails,8" if such intention is clearly ex-
pressed by the Congress."'
4. Whether customary international law is a part of the su-
preme law of the United States remains an issue of fundamental
importance for the determination of the status of the Constitution
in the legal system of this country. The courts were usually inclined
to recognize that the customary international law bends to the will
of Congress.86 The commentators split into two major camps.
According to the traditional monistic position, international
law, superior to national law, did not need to be incorporated into
the domestic legal system; all main components of the law of na-
tions were self-executing parts of national law.87 The modern in-
ternationalist faction 88 does not go that far. The representatives of
this group rather try to develop arguments that opinio juris and the
courts should confirm the presence of elements of international law
in the domestic legal system. Similarly, the confirmation of the
concordant practice by a number of states creating the rules of cus-
tomary international law is evidenced in the writings of interna-
tional lawyers and in judgments of national and international
tribunals.89 Some claimed that customary international law is em-
bedded in the Constitution the same way as some values are im-
plicitly reflected in the body of constitutional law without their
83 See Steinhardt, supra note 80, at 1132 (arguing that at least in Weinberger v. Rossi
the Supreme Court showed some tendency not to construe the Charming Betsy canon in
dualist way).
84 For comments on the changing interpretation of the Charming Betsy canon see
Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 1.
85 In Weinberger v. Rossi, the Supreme Court stated, "one isolated remark by a single
Senator, ambiguous in meaning when examined in context, is insufficient to establish an
intent to abrogate provisions in thirteen international agreements." 456 U.S. at 33 (1982).
For more extensive comments, see Steinhardt, supra note 80, at 1166.
86 For an examination of the widely criticized Supreme Court decisions, see United
States v. Alvarez-Machain 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Ker v. Illinois 119 U.S. 436, (1886). See
also J.M. Rogers, Treaties and Statutes Against the Background of Custom, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND UNITED STATES LAW, 172-181 (1999); see also Schroeder v. Bissell, 5 F.
2d 838 (D. Conn.1925); United States ex rel Pfefer v. Bell, 248 F. 992, 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1918).
For comments, see Steinhardt, supra note 80, at 1104.
87 For more extensive discussion, see Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS
AND VALUEs, 64-67 (1995). See also Bradley, Breard, supra note 3, at 530.
88 Bradley uses the term "internationalist conception" to distinguish the position of
modern doctrine from "pure" and old-fashion monism. See id.
89 See M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 32 (3d
ed. 1977).
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explicit acknowledgment in the text of the constitutional act. 90
Flexibility of the constitution allows for accommodation of custom-
ary international law without the process of formal incorporation.
Some claim that customary international law has the same sta-
tus as federal common-law. As the Reporters stated in the Re-
statement (Third):
"Matters arising under customary international law also arise
under "the laws of the United States," since international law is
"part of our law"'" and is federal law. That federal common law
is within "the laws of the United States" for purposes of both
the "judicial Power of the United States" (Article HI) and the
jurisdiction of the federal district courts' is now established. In
Illinois v. Milwaukee93 the Supreme Court concluded, "Section
1331 jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal com-
mon law as well as those of statutory origin". 94
Commentators who opposed the "internationalist conception"
argued that just as the states may reject any new rule of customary
international law, they may block the incorporation of customary
international law into the national legal system.95 Summarizing
some other arguments, critical to internationalists' position, it has
been contended that there is a clear difference between the federal
common law that is produced by domestic courts and customary
international law, which is a product of the foreign practice and
local opinio juris.96 The customary international law may be ap-
90 See Steinhardt, supra note 80, at 32. For "value" approach to constitutional interpre-
tation, see WILLIAM A. KAILIN, CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23
(1992).
91 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
92 28 U.S.C. §1331 (2000).
93 496 U.S. 91, 92; S.Ct.1385 31 L. ed. 3d 712 (1972).
94 406 U.S. at 100, 92 S.Ct at 139. See RESTATEMENT (TIURD) OF TE LAW, THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) §111 n. 4, at 51-52.
95 See Humprey Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 2 RECUBIL DES
CouRs 1, 49-53 (1962), quoted in Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS, 67-68 (1980).
96 As Louis Henkin wrote, "Unlike law made by treaty, this authentic customary law
ordinarily has not been made intentionally, purposefully, by a 'conspiracy' of states. Nor is
it the product of deliberate exercises of 'will' by states acting separately, aiming to develop
new law. Customary law was not made, it resulted, from an accretion of practices, though
often the practice of individual states was intended to conform to what others had done,
and often it was thought to be required by law (opinio juris) Unlike law made by interna-
tional agreement, it is rarely clear when a norm matured. The scope of the norm is also
likely to be uncertain, as are the reasons for it and the values it is designed to protect."
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES, supra note 87, at 34.
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plied directly only in the absence of domestic law.97 The courts
cannot enforce alleged legislative intent pronounced in legal writ-
ings but not in clearly evidenced adopted legislative acts.98 John
M. Rogers wrote, "[t]o say that the courts have an additional body
of 'higher law' to apply, to be found in the whole amorphous body
of customary international law, is to inject an enormously dis-
torting overdose of additional power into the Judicial Branch." 99
Some other commentators observed that, even if the status of cus-
tomary international law as part of the United States domestic law
was confirmed, it still would not mean that this law enjoys equal
status with the treaties and federal legislation.10
5. The logical conclusions, which stem from the "internation-
alist conception" described above, have to be clearly pronounced.
The concept itself leaves us with several alternatives. If we assume
that customary international law is an element of the supreme law
of the United States, but does not enjoy equal status to treaties and
federal statutes, we have to conclude that the Constitution clearly
prevails with respect to conflicts with any other elements of the
legal system of the country. The Constitution is not only a "primus
inter pares" element of the system; it is the highest and controlling
component of the supreme law.
The above conclusion, however, stems from the assumption
that customary international law is a component of the supreme
law but does not enjoy equal status to treaties and federal legisla-
tion. This assumption itself is questionable because it leads us to
the observation that the highest law of the country has not only a
hierarchical but also a multi-layer structure, with the Constitution
at the top, the treaties and federal statutes in the middle, and cus-
tomary international law at the bottom of the pyramid. In light of
constitutional construction, this concept seems to be, at the least,
questionable.
97 The Supreme Court, in Paquete Habna, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), confirmed that
international law "is part of our law," but added that it is applied by the courts "where
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision." Id.
98 As Justice Scalia stated, "Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators'
intentions." Concurring opinion to the judgment in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 480 U.S. 421;
107 S. Ct. 1207, 1224 (1987).
99 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNITED STATES LAW, supra note 86, at 215.
100 John F. Murphy, "Customary International Law in U.S. Jurisprudence-A Comment
on Draft Restatement II" INTERNATIONAL PRACnTIONERS' NOTEBOOK, October 1982, at
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It leaves us with the second possible interpretation that cus-
tomary international law is not a component of the supreme Law
of the Land, but still has the force of federal law and, as such, is
superior to state law. This approach has further consequences with
regard to other components of the federal law, such as federal ex-
ecutive orders or administrative rules and regulations. The as-
sumption that customary law is federal law but not the Supreme
Law of the Land brings us to the conclusion that it does not only
bend to the will of Congress but, moreover, in a conflict, the rules
and regulations of the federal administrative bodies, made pursu-
ant to federal statute, prevail over the customary law. The way
would be paved for the logical argument that the federal law of the
United States does not prohibit the federal government to violate
customary international law. The position of the Constitution as
the highest law of the land would be unaffected but a conclusion
that the government is not bound by customary international law
would be highly unsatisfactory.
Let us consider the third possibility. If for the sake of this
analysis, we assume that customary international law is a sine qua
non element of the supreme law of the land' 01 and has authority
equal to international agreements,' the conclusions regarding the
position of the Constitution in the legal system of the United States
might be different. Compared to the Constitution, both treaties
and federal statutes are flexible elements of the supreme law of the
United States. They can be altered relatively easily if they conflict
with more rigid constitutional principles. The rules of customary
international law, however, are not subject to any formal amend-
ment process. In fact, once established, they are more rigid than
any municipal legal norms. As Prof. Paust convincingly argued, the
rule "last-in-time" cannot apply to the collisions between custom-
ary law and federal statutes or treaties. "Since customary interna-
tional law is constantly 're-enacted' through a process of generally
shared legal expectation (or it will lose its validity as customary
101 Professor Paust puts a special emphasis on the word "must" in the Court's statement,
that customary international law "must be ascertained and administered." See Reply to
John Murphy's Comment on Incorporating Customary International Law in U.S. Jurispru-
dence [hereinafter Reply], in INTERNI'ATiONAL PRAcTITONERS NOTEBOOK, supra note 100.
102 See John F. Murphy, Customary International Law in U.S. Jurisprudence-A Com-
ment on Draft Restatement II, in INTERNATIONAL PR.AarroNERs NOTEBOOK, supra note
100, at 17.
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law), it seems that customary law must necessarily be 'last-in-time'
and would prevail even under the Restatement test.'
10 3
Along this line of reasoning, it may not be expected that cus-
tomary international law will be changed if its rules collide with
any constitution of the world. Contrarily, it is highly possible that
the constitution will be amended to accommodate some new rules
of customary international law inconsistent with the Constitution
itself. Otherwise, any amendment or interpretation of the Consti-
tution, bringing it in conflict with customary international law,
would make the constitutional structure internally incoherent, and
as such, would have to be recognized as unconstitutional itself.
It may be assumed, and is probably true as far as the United
States is concerned, that in recent judicial practice the Constitution
would prevail over inconsistent customary law. The result would,
however, undermine the consistency of the constitutional system of
the country. Logically, if customary international law is a compo-
nent of the Supreme Law of the Land, it cannot be accepted that
one element of the supreme legal structure will collide with an-
other or that some components of customary international law will
be recognized and others will be disqualified. If the consistency of
the Constitution is to be maintained, customary international law
has to be either left outside of the supreme law of the land or with
time, being the most rigid element of the system, it will become its
controlling component. The Constitution will be the basic and fun-
damental element but clearly not the superior one.
IV. LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE MEMBER STATES
Since the very early stages of the European Communities' in-
tegration it became quite clear that it would be difficult to compare
Community law with any other legal system in the world. The
Community contained some features of an international organiza-
tion and some features of a federal entity, a04 and its law had com-
ponents typical of international and national legal systems. On the
103 Paust, Reply, supra note 101, at 19.
104 Although the status of the Community as a federation has never been formally con-
firmed, the presence of the federal elements in the Community's structure, especially with
regard to judicial and legal system has been repeatedly emphasized. See T.C. Hartley,
Federalism, Courts, and Legal Systems: The Emerging Constitution of the European Com-
munity, 34 A. J. COMP. L. 229 (1986); INTEGRATION THROUGH LAw, (M. Cappelletti, M.
Seccombe, J.Weiler, eds.) (1986) (3 vols).
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one hand, the fundamental principles of the Community's structure
can be found in international treaties; on the other hand, the legis-
lation produced by the Community institutions is an important
component of the Community's law. The fundamental goal of the
Community (in accordance with Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty of
Rome),10 5 similarly to many international organizations, is to coor-
dinate economic policy of the member states. Another and equally
important goal is the creation of common policies toward outside
world. This goal was to be accomplished by the replacement of
custom territories of several states by one custom territory of the
Community, a process resembling the creation of a national entity.
The subjects of the Community law are the states, the Commu-
nity's institutions, legal persons and individuals. It additionally
gives the Community a hybrid nature characterized by interna-
tional and national features.
Since the Community's conception, the relations between this
'supranational' entity and its national components have been com-
plicated. The member states attempted to save their sovereign pre-
rogatives and the Community institutions claimed that their acts
were binding because the organs endowed with the appropriate su-
preme power adopted them. 0 6 Both the member states and the
Community institutions differ in their evaluation of the degree to
which mutual interdependencies reflect on the concept of
supremacy of member states constitutions. For this reason their
views should be examined separately.
1. The Treaty of Rome provided only for an obligation of gen-
eral loyalty to the Community'0 7 but did not contain any express
clauses about the supremacy of the Community law; the European
Court of Justice has judicially developed this doctrine step by step.
105 G.A. BERMANN, R.J. GOEBEL, W.J. DAVEY, E.M. Fox, EUROPEAN ConMiuNrrY
LAW: SELECtED DocuMENms, 6-7 (1993).
106 In this way, the Community legal system differed from the international system in
which international commitments are determined by the states themselves. See ECJ (Euro-
pean Court of Justice), Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen (1963), E.C. R. 1 at 10-12. See also T.C. Hartley, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN CoMMUNrY LAW (4'h ed), 10 1998. See also CONSrTruTIONAL LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, 505 (K. Lenaerts, P. Van Nuffel, R. Bray, eds.) (1999).
107 Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome stated that " Member States shall take all appropri-
ate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising
out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community.
They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's Tasks. They shall abstain from
any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty."
TREATY OF RoME, art.v.
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As early as 1963 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) de-
clared that the Treaty of Rome was more than an agreement creat-
ing obligations between the contracting parties. In Van Gend En
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie Der Belastingen, the Court
stated:
We must conclude from this that the Community constitutes a
new legal order in international law, for whose benefit the States
have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within the limited
fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only the member-
States but also their nationals. Community law, therefore, apart
from legislation by the member-States, not only imposes obliga-
tions on individuals but also confers on them legal rights.'" 8
In this way the Court established the foundations for two fun-
damental doctrines of direct applicability and direct effectiveness
of Community law. The first one was expresis verbis declared by
Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome, which stated that regulations
issued by the Community's institutions "shall be binding in its en-
tirety and directly applicable in all Member States." In Amminis-
trazione Delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal Spa'0 9 the Court
further explained that direct applicability "means that rules of
Community law must be fully and uniformly applied in all the
member-States from the date of their entry into force and for so
long as they continue in force." In Van Gend, the Court reminded
the second doctrine that certain treaty provisions impose not only
the obligations on the member-states but "produce direct effects in
the legal relations between the member-states and their
citizens." 110
Building upon the Van Gend and Simmenthal cases, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice laid down the principle of the supremacy of
Community law and explained fundamental rules of conflict be-
tween the Community law and the national laws. First, the Court
stated that direct applicability of the Community law meant that
the conflicting provisions of current national law would have to be
inapplicable;"' second, it would "preclude the valid adoption of
new legislative measures to the extent to which they would be in-
108 26/62 (1963), ECR 1 (1963), C.M.L.R. 105.
109 10677 (1978), ECR 629 (1978), 3 C.M.L.R. 263.
11o 26/62 (1963), ECR 1 (1963), C.M.L.R. 105.
111 Amministrazione Delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal Spa, 106/77 (1978), ECR
629 (1978), 3 C.M.L.R. 263.
[Vol. 9:253
SUPREME LAW OR BASIC LAW?
compatible with Community provisions.' 1 12 Logically these pro-
nouncements imposed several positive obligations on the member
states and national courts; the first had to adjust their laws that
conflicted with the supreme Community law,1 3 the second had to
refrain from applying voidable national provisions and had to in-
terpret the national laws in accordance with Community law."
4
The question remained whether the principle of Community
law primacy extends to the Constitutions of member states. The
European Court reviewed this issue in Costa v. Ente Nazionale per
L'Energia Elettrica (ENEL)."5 In this case, the Italian Constitu-
tional Court ruled that the Treaty of Rome was ratified in Italy by a
simple statute and in accordance with the national rules of conflicts
it has to give way to any subsequent Italian legislation.116 The Eu-
ropean Court of Justice was asked for a preliminary ruling and
stated that "It]he transfer, by member-States, from their national
order, in favor of the Community order of the rights and obliga-
tions arising from the Treaty, carries with it a clear limitation of
their sovereign right upon which a subsequent unilateral law, in-
compatible with the aims of the Community, cannot prevail.""' 7
Advocate General Lagrange submitted an opinion to ECJ and sug-
gested that in joining the Community the member-States must rec-
oncile their constitutions with the Community law. Furthermore,
they have "only two courses of action... either to amend its Con-
stitution or to renounce the Treaty itself."" 8
In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the ECJ clearly rejected
the position of the German Administrative Court confirming the
primacy of the German Basic Law over the Community law. The
ECJ stated:
Recourse to legal rules or concepts of national law to judge the
validity of instruments promulgated by Community institutions
would have the effect of harming the unity and efficacy of Com-
112 Id.
113 Id. For more comments, see CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 507
(K. Lenaerts, P Van Nuffel, R. Bray, eds., 1999).
114 Commission v. Italy, Case 48/71 (1972), E.C.R. 3247 and Case C-382/92 Commission
v. United Kingdom (1994), E.C.R. 1-2435.
115 Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64 (1964), E.C.R. 585.
116 See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COM-
MUNIT" LAW 193 (1993).
117 JAMES D. DINNAGE & JOHN F. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EURO-
PEAN UNION (1996) (quoting Costa v. ENEL).
118 BERMANN, supra note 116.
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munity law. The validity of such instruments can only be judged
in the light of Community law. In fact, the law born from the
Treaty, the issue of an autonomous source, could not, by its very
nature, have the courts opposing to it rules of national law of
any nature whatever without losing its Community character
and without the legal basis of the Community itself being put in
question. Therefore the validity of a Community, instrument or
its effect within a member-State cannot be affected by allega-
tions that it strikes at either the fundamental rights as formu-
lated in that State's constitution or the principles of a national
constitutional structure. 119
2. The member-States had two different approaches to the process
of assimilation of Community law into their national legal systems.
The monist approach, recognizing the supremacy of international
or supranational law over the legal components of the national sys-
tem, allowed the states to join the Community without having to
revise their constitutions. The countries following the dualist ap-
proach had to transfer or delegate competencies to the
Community.
The monist approach was most clearly represented by the con-
stitutionalism of the Benelux countries,'120 and equipped these
states with a legal framework well suited for the acceptance of the
principle of the supremacy of Community law. Concurrently with
this doctrine, Article 94 of the 1983 Constitution of the Nether-
lands declares that "[s]tatutory regulations in force within the
Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict
with provisions of treaties that are binding on all persons or of res-
olutions by international institutions." The Constitution resolves
121
that in conflict between the treaty and the Constitution, the treaty
may prevail if this result was approved by the vote of two-thirds of
the Parliament, the number of votes needed to amend the
Constitution.
The position of Community law within the Belgian legal struc-
ture is less clear.12 2 Article 34 of the 1831 Constitution (amended
in 1970) allows for the limited transfer of power by treaty or law to
119 DINNAGE, supra note 117, at 96 (quoting Case 11/70, International Handelsgesell-
schaft GMGH v. Enfuhrund-Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel (hereinafter So-
lange I), 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1972 C.M.L.R. 255).
120 Benelux was an agreement between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg,
signed originally in 1948 and establishing the first custom unions in the Western Europe.
121 See NETi. CONST. art. 91(3) (1983).
122 See BERMANN, supra note 116, at 214.
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international institutions. However, the Belgian courts did not
originally confirm the priority of Community law over the domestic
law. In Minister for Economic Affairs v. Fromagerie Franco-
Suisse'LeSki'"l the Belgian government used the argument that
was already exploited in Costa v ENEL. Belgium argued that the
subsequent statute of 1968 could supersede ratification of the
Treaty of Rome by regular statute. The Belgian Court of Cassation
rejected this argument and confirmed that a treaty prevails in a
conflict with a statute. As T.C. Hartley commented: "[i]n other
words, the Court declared in this case, that Belgium was a monist
country. Consequently, the conflict was not between two statutes,
but between two instruments of a fundamentally different nature: a
treaty and a statute."' 24 The Court then continued:
The rule that a statute repeals a previous statute in so far as
there is a conflict between the two, does not apply in the case of
a conflict between a treaty and a statute. In the event of a con-
flict between a norm of domestic law and a norm of interna-
tional law that produces direct effect in the internal legal system,
the rule established by the treaty shall prevail. The primacy of
the treaty results from the very nature of international treaty
law.
This is a fortiori the case when a conflict exists, as in the
present case, between a norm of internal law and a norm of
Community law.
The reason is that the treaties which have created Commu-
nity law have instituted a new legal system in whose favor the
Member States have restricted the exercise of their sovereign
powers in the areas determined by those treaties. 2 5
Similarly, in Luxembourg the supremacy of international law
over national law was confirmed by the rulings of the Court of Cas-
sation and the Council of State.1
26
The member-States, following a dualistic approach, challenged
some conclusions inherent in the logic of the principle of
supremacy of Community law. First, they were not inclined to ac-
cept that the position of Community law in the national legal struc-
123 Cour de Cassation, Belgium, May 21, 1971, (1972) C.M.L.R. 330.
124 TREVOR C. HARTLEY, Tim FOUNDATIONS OF TBE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
235-36 (1998).
125 Cour de Cassation, C.M.L.R. at 373.
126 Cour de cassation July 14, 1954, Pas.lux, Vol 16, 150; Conseil d'Etat, November 21,
1984, Pas.lux, Vol 26, 174, See K. Lenaerts, CONSTITUnONAL LAW OF T=E EUROPEAN
UNIoN, supra note 113, at 521.
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tures stems from the Community law itself.'2 7 As it was expressed
by the German Federal Constitutional Court examining the com-
patibility of the Maastricht Treaty with the German Constitu-
tion,'18 the competence of the Union and the European
Communities must lay somewhere other than in the organs of the
Community; "the competence to determine the competence" still
belongs to the member-states. 29 Second, the transfer of compe-
tencies does not mean full subordination of member-states' law to
Community law. Some competencies and powers are shared by the
European Union and member-States and some are clearly reserved
for the states by the principle of subsidiarity. The German Court
stated:
Accordingly, the Union Treaty takes account of the inde-
pendence and sovereignty of the member-States, since it obliges
the Union to respect the national identities of its member-States
(Article F(91)) of the Union Treaty), it equips the Union and
the European Communities only with specific competencies and
powers in accordance with the principle of limited individual
competencies (Article E of the Union Treaty, Article 31 3b(1) of
the E.C. Treaty), and then establishes the principle of sub-
sidiarity for the Union (Article B(2) of the Union Treaty) and
for the European Community (Article 3b(2) of the E.C. Treaty)
as a binding principle of law. 13
0
Generally speaking, it took several years for the original mem-
ber-states, following dualistic traditions, to recognize the principle
of supremacy of Community law. The strongest objections were
from the countries, such as Germany and Italy who after World
War II incorporated strong protections of human rights into their
constitutional laws. They claimed that the Treaty of Rome did not
originally have any special provisions protecting human rights and
the national courts may recognize direct effect of Community law
only as far as this law does not fundamentally alter the
Constitution.
127 Van Gend En Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie Der Belastingen, 26/62 (1963),
ECR 1 (1963), C.M.L.R. 105.
128 See Brunner v. European Union Treaty, 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92 (1994) 1 C.M.L.R.
57.
129 For more comments, see Neil MacCormick, The Maastricht-Utreil Sovereignty Now,
1 EUR. L.J. 259 - 304 (1995).
130 DINNAGE, supra note 117, at 165-66 (quoting Brunner v. European Union Treaty, 1
C.M.L.R. 57).
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In Costa v. ENEL, the Italian Constitutional Court originally
stated that Community law will be applied by the state judges only
by virtue of the adaptation of national law to Community law.
131
In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-Und Vor-
ratsstelle fur Getreide und Futermittel'32 (frequently referred to as
Solange I), the German Federal Constitutional Court went even
further with the criticism of the Community's human rights policy.
It said that the Community still "lacks a democratically legitimated
parliament" and "still lacks in particular a codified catalogue of
fundamental rights."'13 3 Ruling on the relationship between the
German Constitution and Community law, the German Federal
Constitutional Court again confirmed the supreme character of the
German Constitution over any other piece of law binding in Ger-
many. It stated:
Article 24 of the Constitution deals with the transfer of sov-
ereign rights to inter-State institutions. This cannot be taken lit-
erally. Like every constitutional provision of a similar
fundamental nature, Article 24 of the Constitution must be un-
derstood and construed in the overall context of the whole Con-
stitution. That is, it does not open the way to amending the
basic structure of the Constitution, which forms the basis of its
identity, without a formal amendment to the Constitution. Arti-
cle 24 of the Constitution nullifies any amendment of the Treaty
which would destroy the identity of the valid constitution of the
Federal Republic of Germany by encroaching on the structures
which go to make it up.'
3 4
The status of international law in the French legal system is
complicated. The 1958 Constitution (as amended) puts emphasis
on the coherence of domestic law. On the one hand, Article 55 of
the Constitution recognizes the superiority of international agree-
ments over domestic laws (contingent on reciprocal approach of
the other parties to the agreement); on the other hand, Article 54
states that "if the Constitutional Council shall declare that an inter-
national commitment contains a clause contrary to the Constitu-
tion, the authorization to ratify or approve this commitment may
be given only after amendment of the Constitution." In other
131 PAOLO MEGNOZZI, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW FROM r TREATY OF ROME TO
THE TREATY OF AMSrREnm 95 (Patrick Del Luca trans. 2d ed. 1999).
132 German Federal Constitutional Court, Case 2 BvL 52/71, 37 BverfGE 271, (1974) 2
C.M.L.R. 540 (May 29, 1974).
133 DINNAGE, supra note 117, at 161-64 (quoting Solange I).
134 Id.
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words, the Constitution does not allow international agreements to
violate the Constitution, but creates a framework for amending the
Constitution if the international commitments of the state would
require this result. The problem of supremacy of Community law
was left unresolved.
In the argument before French Court of Cassation in Adminis-
tration des Douanes v. Societe Cafes Jacques Vabre & J. Weigel et
CIE Sarl, the Procurator General encouraged the Court not to
base the ruling confirming the superiority of the international
agreement over the domestic statute on Article 55, but to recognize
that Community law as superior because France transferred to the
Community some portion of sovereign rights. The Court took the
middle road. It referred to Article 55 of the Constitution but also
confirmed that Community law is a separate legal order with
"greater authority than that of statutes.' 1 35
The French Council of State (Conseil d'etait) position was
more controversial. In Syndicat General des Fabricants de
Semoules de France,'36 it stated that an administrative court cannot
afford treaties precedence over subsequent legislation which con-
flicts with them; this position also applies to Community law. In
other decisions, the Council tried to interpret this statement as rec-
ognizing that administrative courts, such as the Council of State,
cannot review validity of legislation. 37 In Raul Georges Nicolo
and Another, the Council confirmed that Article 55 of the Consti-
tution should be interpreted as "a solemn reaffirmation of France's
regard for the theoretical supremacy of international law" 38and
that the courts in other member-States of the Community recog-
nized the principle of the supremacy of Community law. It stated:
So far as foreign courts are concerned, and here, I shall con-
fine myself to the framework of European law, all I would say is
that your Court is now the last which formally refuses to apply
135 BERMANN, supra note 116, at 207-09 (citing Case 6, Administration des Covanes v.
Societe Cafes Jacques Vabre, 2 S.M.L.R. 336 (1975).
136 See Syndicat General des Fabricants de Semoules de France, (1970) C.M.L.R. 395
(D.P. III 1968).
137 See Raul Georges Nicolo and Another, (1990) 1 C.M.L.R. 173. The Administrative
courts in France can review only the acts of administration and the constitutionality of the
statutes before their enactment can be determined only be they Constitutional Council.
See Hartley, supra note 125, at 242-50.
138 Raul Georges Nicolo and Another 1 C.M.L.R. 173 (1900). The court added that "by
passing a law incompatible with a prior treaty the legislature would infringe the principle of
the supremacy of international law as expressed by Article 55." Id.
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Community measures which are contradicted by later laws. By
way of example, it is sufficient to mention that the Constitu-
tional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany for its part
finally accepted the opposite principle no less than eighteen
years ago, by a decision of 9 June 1971. And even more signifi-
cant is the case of the Italian Constitutional Court which, al-
though hindered by a dualistic legal tradition and preliminary
reference machinery applying to international law, finally went
so far as to authorize the ordinary courts of their own motion
not to apply laws contrary to Community regulations, by an im-
portant judgment of 8 June 1984.1'9
In fact, the French Council of State was right to observe that
both German and Italian courts, originally reluctant to accept the
superiority of Community law, significantly softened their posi-
tions. In the case, Re Application of Wunsche Handelsgesellschaft
("Solange II"), the German Federal Constitutional Court admitted
that the European Community has safeguards for human rights
protection that comply with German constitutional standards. n
The Court still referred to the German Constitution as the highest
domestic law but stated that it "will no longer exercise its jurisdic-
tion to decide on the applicability of secondary Community legisla-
tion cited as the legal basis for any acts of German courts or
authorities within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany"'' Similarly, in Apa Granital v. Amministrazione
delle Fianze dello Stato, the Italian Constitutional Court stated that
"directly applicable EEC legal provisions enter and stay in force in
Italy . . . without their effect being impaired by any municipal
statute." 
42
In 1958, the French Constitution was amended after it was
deemed incompatible with the Treaty of the European Union. Sec-
tions 1-4, added to Article 88, confirmed France's participation in
both the European Communities and the European Union and
specifically stated that "France agrees to the transfer of powers
necessary for the establishment of European economic and mone-
tary union and for the determination of rules relating to the cross-
139 Id.
140 See DINNAGE, supra note 117, at 165.
141 Joined Cases 2 BvR 197/83 & 73 BverfGE 339, Re Application of Wunsche Handel-
sgesellschaft (Solange II), 3 C.M.L.R. 225 (1987).
142 BE.MANN, supra note 116, at 230.
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ing of the external borders of the Member States of the European
Community."'43
The problem of the superiority of Community law was even
more controversial in the United Kingdom where it seemed to dis-
tinctly clash with the principle of legislative supremacy of the Brit-
ish Parliament.144 The European Community Act of 1972
instructed the British courts to construe "any enactment passed or
to be passed" in accordance with Community law and to give legal
effect to any "enforceable Community right." The British constitu-
tional system guarantees that the Parliament cannot bind its suc-
cessor; that means that it cannot adopt laws that cannot be
changed. This principle forced the incorporation of the clause that
all commitments of the United Kingdom with regard to its partici-
pation in the Communities' order are subject to the exceptions that
may be provided by "any Act passed after this Act.' 1 45 This state-
ment inevitably paved the way to the dispute about the result of a
possible conflict between a British statute and Community
legislation.
The Civil Division of the British Court of Appeals tried to ad-
dress this issue in Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith. The Court concluded
that in accordance with Articles 2(1) and (4) of the European
Communities Act, the British legislation, deficient or inconsistent
with Community law, should "give priority to Community law."'
1 46
Lord Denning noted, however, that, although Parliament does not
show any such intention, if it would deliberately pass an act violat-
ing Community law, the courts would have to follow the Parlia-
mentary statutes.
Denning's opinion was widely discussed but was not con-
firmed by the House of Lords. In Regina v. Secretary of State for
Transport ex parte Factortame LTD, 47 Lord Bridge, speaking for
the Chamber, said:
If the supremacy.., of Community law over the national
law of Member States was not always inherent in the EEC
143 See FR. CONST., Title XIV (1958).
144 See EMLYN COPEL STEWART WADE & ANTHONY WILFRED BRADLEY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 38-61 (1970) (Providing more extensive examination of the meaning of the
principle of parliamentary procedure).
145 European Communities Act of 1972 § 2/4 (1972).
146 See Macarthys v. Smith, 3 All E.R. 325, 3 C.M.L.R. 44 (1979).
147 R. v. Secretary of State for Transport Ex p. Factortame (No. 2) [1991] 1 All E.R. 70,
[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 375.
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Treaty it was certainly well established in the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom
joined the Community.... Under the terms of the [European
Communities] Act of 1972 it has always been clear that it was
the duty of a United Kingdom court, when delivering final judg-
ment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict
with any directly enforceable rule of Community law.'48
During the 1990's, not only did this opinion prevail in British
jurisprudence; the principle of the primacy of Community law was
well established basically in nearly all Member-States.
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE NEW
EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES
The socialist approach to mutual relations of international and
national law has always been vague. In theory, Soviet jurispru-
dence has criticized both monist and dualist positions as typical of
"bourgeois" ideology.149 In practice, the socialist lawyers, follow-
ing Moscow's official doctrine, claimed that international law im-
poses obligations on and grants rights to states exclusively and that
individuals cannot invoke international agreements without their
provisions being incorporated into the domestic legal system. A
few legal authorities, such as S. Rozmaryn in Poland, took different
positions and argued that international treaties should be applied
directly (ex prioprio vigore) within the domestic legal system.
150
The fall of communism in Europe that started in the nineties
turned the region of former Soviet dominance into a major labora-
tory of constitutional works. Most of the East-Central European
democracies, in drafting new constitutions, decided to clarify their
positions on the relationship between international and municipal
law. This process of constitutionalization of international law was
not successful in many countries.
Several countries in the region decided to constitutionalize the
principle of supremacy of the constitution within the structure of
domestic law. To give a few examples, the 1997 Polish Constitution
states (Article 8) that "[t]he Constitution is the supreme law of the
148 BERMANN, supra note 116, at 241.
149 H.J. Uibopuu, International and Municipal Law, ENcYc. SovIET LAW 389-90 (2d ed.
1985).
150 See S. ROZMARYN, USTAWvA W PoLsKIE RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ LUDOWEJ 329,332,340
(1964) (Statute in the Polish Republic); see also W. Czaplinski, International Law and the
Polish Constitution, in CONsTrrTUnONAL ESSAYS 290 (M. Wyrzykowski, ed., 1999).
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Republic of Poland;" the 1991 Constitution of Bulgaria declares in
Article 5 that it "is the supreme law, and no other law may contra-
dict it;" "[a]ny law or other statute which contradicts the Constitu-
tion shall be invalid," reads Article 7 of the 1992 Constitution of
Lithuania; "[i]n the Republic of Croatia laws shall conform with
the Constitution" proclaims Article 5 of the 1998 Constitution.1
5 '
Although some other states do not express this rule with compara-
ble clarity, 152 the intention of the drafters of the new East-Central
European basic laws to recognize the supremacy of the Constitu-
tion within the domestic legal system is commonly admitted. 53
The supremacy of the constitutional laws in relation to interna-
tional law is much less clear. The careful examination of the new
constitutions warrants several observations.
1. Most of the constitutions of the countries of the former So-
viet Union declare their general respect for international law.
Some restrict themselves to general and enigmatic statements, such
as, "The Republic of Poland respects international law binding
upon it."' 54 Others provide more elaborate provisions emphasizing
the country's recognition of universal rules and regulations of in-
ternational law and an intention to harmonize the internal laws
with international obligations. 55 Still others limit their recognition
to the commitments under international treaties without giving
mention to the rules of customary international law.1
5 6
2. Following dualist tradition, several East-Central European
countries are trying to emphasize that their commitments are lim-
ited to the elements of international law, which are recognized as
components of municipal laws. In some states (such as Romania)
this includes just international treaties; in others (such as Russia) it
also includes "commonly recognized principles and norms of inter-
151 ALB. CONST. art. 4/2; see also KAz. CONST. art. 4/2 (showing similar provisions).
152 The rule is not expresis verbis declared by the amended 1949 Constitution of Hun-
gary, the 1992 Constitution of Estonia or the 1992 Constitution of Slovakia, and is only
indirectly invoked by the 1992 Constitution of the Czech Republic (Article 9/1), 1996 Con-
stitution of Belarus (Article 7) or 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation (Article 15).
153 See R.R. Ludwikowski, Constitutional Order and International Law, in COMPARA-
TIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2000).
154 POL. CONST. art. 9 (amended 1997).
155 See HUNG. CONST. art. 7/1 (amended 1949) ("The legal system of the Republic of
Hungary accepts the universally recognized rules and regulations of international law and
harmonizes the internal laws and statutes of the country with the obligations assumed
under international law.").
156 See RoM. CONsT. art. 11 (amended 1991).
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national law. ' 157 It is not clear at all whether these "commonly
recognized principles" would have to be formally incorporated into
the domestic laws or simply assimilated by the lack of their renun-
ciation by the state's organs. It also remains unclear as to whether
this distinction makes a difference for the individuals claiming
rights on the basis of these "principles" and for the courts that
would have to apply them.
The statement of the 1997 Polish Constitution that the country
"respects international law binding upon it" (Article 9) has been
interpreted as meaning "automatic incorporation of the rules of
customary international law into the domestic law."' 58 The Rus-
sian Constitution, more elaborate than the Polish act, reads as fol-
lows: "Laws and other legal acts adopted by the Russian
Federation may not contravene the Constitution of the Russian
Federation. The commonly recognized principles and norms of in-
ternational law and international treaties of the Russian Federation
shall be a component part of its legal system." 59 Whether the
"adoption" means a formal incorporation or assimilation of the
"commonly recognized principles" is not clear. As the second in-
terpretation cannot be ruled out, the phrase has to be subject to
interpretation of the Constitutional Tribunal.
3. The status of the principles of customary international law
in the hierarchy of the domestic laws is vague. The dualistic ap-
proach subjects all elements of municipal law, including incorpo-
157 Id. ("The treaties ratified by Parliaments, according to the law, are part of domestic
law."); see also LrrH. CONST. art. 138 (amended 1992) ("International agreements which
are ratified by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania shall be the constituent part of the
legal system of the Republic of Lithuania."); Russ. CONST. art. 15 (amended 1993) ("The
commonly recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties
of the Russian Federation shall be a component of its legal system.").
158 R. Szafarz, Miedzynarodowy porzadek prawny i jego odbicie w poskim prawie kon-
stytucyjnym (International Legal Order and its Reflection in the Polish Constitutional
Law), in PRAWO MIEDZYNARODOWE I WSPOLNOTONVE W WEVNETRZNYM PORZADKU
PRAWNYM (International Law and Community Law in the Internal Legal Order) [hereinaf-
ter INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CoMMUNrrY LAW] (M. Kruk, ed., 1997) at 24. W. Czaplinski
wrote: "It (Article 9) states that the Republic of Poland respects international law binding
it. The provision covers all international law notwithstanding its origin (whether conven-
tional or customary)." CONSTrrUTIONAL ESSAYS 298 (M. Wyrzykowski, ed., 1999).
159 Russ. CONsT. art. 15. It has to be observed that the 1992 Constitution of Lithuania
provides only that "[i]n conducting foreign policy, the Republic of Lithuania shall pursue
the universally recognized principles and norms of international law." It is not clear
whether the drafters intended not to bind the state with these principles within domestic
policy.
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rated elements of international law, to constitutional control. This
is clearly confirmed by some constitutions.
The Constitution of Estonia reads as follows: "State power
shall be exercised solely on the basis of this Constitution and such
laws which are in accordance with the Constitution. Universally
recognized principles and norms of international law shall be an
inseparable part of the Estonian legal system."'160 Even this rela-
tively elaborate statement does not answer the question of what
would happen if "universally recognized principles" collide with
the Constitution? Does this mean that only selected universal
principles that correspond with the Constitution, are part of the
domestic legal system? The assumption that "all universally recog-
nized principles" are automatically assimilated into domestic law
might collide with the principle of primacy of the Constitution. On
the one hand, as it was already observed, it is difficult to project
that the collision with any national norms would trigger a change of
the "commonly recognized universal principles;" on the other
hand, the recognition of the necessary adjustments to the Constitu-
tion every time conflict occurs logically undermines the principle of
the Constitution's supremacy.
4. The intention of the drafters of some of East-Central Euro-
pean constitutions to recognize the special dedication of their
states to the standards of international human rights protection is
commendable but confusing.
The Constitution of Slovakia declares that "[t]he international
agreements on human rights and basic freedoms which were rati-
fied by the Slovak Republic and which have been declared legal,
take precedence over its laws whenever they guarantee a wider
scope of constitutional rights and freedoms."' 6 ' The Constitution
of Romania goes even further in stating that "(1) Constitutional
provisions on the rights and freedoms of citizens shall be inter-
preted and applied in accordance with the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights and with other treaties and pacts to which
160 EST. CONST. art. 3 (amended 1992). Similarly, Article 15 of the Constitution of the
Russian Federation states, "The commonly recognized principles and norms of interna-
tional law and international treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of
its legal system."
161 SLOVK. CONsT. art 11 (amended 1992). Article 10 of the Czech Republic Constitu-
tion reads as follows, "Ratified and promulgated international treaties on human rights
and fundamental freedoms to which the Czech Republic is obligated are directly binding
and take precedence over the law."
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Romania is a party; (2) if there is disagreement between the pacts
and treaties on fundamental human rights to which Romania is a
party and domestic laws, then international regulations will have
priority."' 62 The intention of the drafters to assimilate into their
countries' legal framework the rules of customary international law
on human rights is clear. It is still unclear whether these rules
would "have priority" over all "domestic laws" including the
Constitution.
5. Most of the countries that have in their constitutions provi-
sions concerning the rank of international law in the hierarchy of
domestic law limit these statements to the relationships between
statutes and international agreements.
The relevant provisions of the 1997 Constitution of Poland are
quite elaborate. The Constitution grants the right to ratify and re-
nounce international agreements to the President of the Repub-
lic. 1 6 3 It distinguishes between international agreements that
require the prior consent of the laws for ratification and those
which are ratified without the consent. 64 Self-executing agree-
ments are directly applicable after their promulgation; other agree-
ments become a part of domestic law after the adoption of
implementing laws. 65
The Polish Constitution confirms that ratified international
agreements are a source of domestic law, but their rank in the hier-
archy of the laws varies. Article 91 (2) states that, in case of con-
flict, an international agreement ratified upon prior statutory
consent takes precedence over statutes. 166 The placement, after
the statutes, of the other agreements in the list of the sources of
law (Article 87), most likely indicates the intention of the drafters
to give them a subordinate status in relation to the statutory law
although higher than the acts of sub-statutory character.
The constitutional provisions of other new East-Central Euro-
pean democracies, with regard to the relations of international
agreements to statutes, do not depart from the position of the Po-
162 RoM. CONsT. art. 20 (amended 1991).
163 See PoL CONST. art. 133(1).
164 See POL. CONST. arts. 88, 89, 90 (2, 3). The consent requires the vote of two-thirds of
both chambers in the presence of at least half of the the Deputies and Senators. The
consent can also be granted by a nationwide referendum. Id.
165 POL. CONST. art. 91 (1).
166 The international agreements do not prevail, however, over the Constitution. See R.
Szafarz, supra note 158, at 33.
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lish constituent organs. The 1992 Constitution of the Czech Re-
public briefly states that the treaties on human rights and
fundamental freedoms, political treaties and economic treaties of a
general nature, and non-self-executing international agreements
require the approval of Parliament.'67 Precedence over the domes-
tic law is reserved only for ratified and promulgated international
treaties on human rights and freedoms;168 the conflicts between
other international agreements and statutes seem to be governed
by the principle lex posterior derogat legi priori.
The 1992 Constitution of Slovakia singles out the agreements
on human rights and freedoms that are given superior status to the
laws if the scope of protection granted by the international agree-
ment is wider than that of national law.169 The agreement on ac-
cession of Slovakia to international organizations requires the
implementing action of Parliament in the form of a constitutional
law, which requires a vote of three-fifth of all the deputies;170 the
requirement clearly gives the accession agreements a higher rank
than regular statutes. The international "economic and political
agreements of a general nature" require prior consent of Parlia-
ment and non-self-executing agreements need to be incorporated
into domestic law through appropriate legislative action.17 ' These
agreements have a status equal to statutory laws. The conclusion
of other agreements seem to be left to the discretion of the govern-
ment and as such they have the statues equal to generally binding
orders, meaning that they are valid only if they are adopted in ac-
cordance with the Constitution and statutes. 7 2
Article 5 of the 1991 Bulgarian Constitution gives the duly rat-
ified, promulgated and, if necessary, implemented international
agreements precedence over conflicting domestic legislation. The
1996 Constitution of Belarus recognizes only the supremacy of the
universally recognized principles of international law over the na-
tional laws, but as far as the treaties are concerned it states only
that they cannot violate the Constitution.173 Article 15 of the 1993
Constitution of Russian Federation more clearly confirms the pre-
167 CZECH REP. CONST. art. 49 (2).
168 CZECH REP. CONST. art. 10.
169 SLOV. CONST. art. 11.
170 SLoV. CONST. art. 86 (c).
171 SLOV. CONST. art. 86 (e).
172 SLOV. CONST. art 125 (c)
173 BULG. CONST. art. 8. Article 116 grants the Constitutional Tribunal the right to rule
on the conformity of all law in the country. The placement of "instruments of international
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cedence of international treaties over conflicting national laws.
The Constitutions of other countries in the region confirm that the
ratified and eventually implemented agreements are an integral el-
ement of domestic law but leave working out the appropriate rules
of conflict to the Constitutional Tribunals.
6. Several countries incorporated statements allowing them
accession to European Community. The relevant constitutional
provisions vary from general recognition of the states' participation
in international or regional structures to the specific clauses al-
lowing the states to transfer sovereign rights to international organ-
ization. Article 136 of the 1992 Lithuanian Constitution provides
an example of the first type of arrangement. It reads, "The Repub-
lic of Lithuania shall participate in international organizations pro-
vided that they do not contradict the interests and independence of
the State." 74 The 1997 Polish Constitution is more specific and
speaks about "the transmission of competencies of organs of State
in some matters" to international organizations. 175 If the accession
takes place and the transfer of sovereign powers occurs, the coun-
tries of East-Central Europe will be subject to the supreme control
of Community law in the same way as the other member-States
that formerly joined the Union. The intention of the drafters of the
Polish Constitution to recognize the priority of Community law is
confirmed by Article 91(3) that states "[i]f an agreement, ratified
by the Republic of Poland, establishes an international organiza-
tion, the laws established by it shall be applied directly and have
precedence in the event of a conflict of laws.' 76 The constitutional
commentators of this clause were quite aware that "transmission"
(przekazanie) of competencies, although not irreversible, would
eventually mean the renunciation of the exclusive control of the
state's organs over the country's internal affairs.'7 7 As it was ar-
gued in the chapter of this article on the European Community, the
law" after the Constitution, the laws and decrees might suggest the intention of the drafters
to give international agreements the status lower than the instruments of national law.
174 Article 7 of the 1992 Slovak Constitution reads: "The Slovak Republic may, by a free
decision, enter a union with other states. The right of secession from such a union shall not
be restricted. The joining of a union with other states or the secession from such a union
shall be decided by a constitutional law and consequent referendum."
175 POL. CONST. Article 90(1).
176 W. Czaplinski, in CONS TTUToNAL EssAys, supra note 158, at 298.
177 J. Barcz, Konstytucyjne problemy stosowania prawa Unii Europejskiej w PosIce w
swietle dotychczasowych doswiadczen panstw czlonkowskich (Constitutional Problems with
Application of the law of the European Union in Poland in the light of the recent exper-
iences of the member-States), in Szafarz, supra note 158, at 207.
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process leading to the recognition of the superiority of the Com-
munity law over the domestic law legitimizes the argument that
questions the supreme character of the national constitution. As J.
Barcz correctly observed in Poland, "[The law of the European
Union] as a law of the treaty will be regulated by the (national)
constitutional provisions on international agreements; as the con-
stitutional law of a supranational organization it should take prece-
dence before all 'national law,' constitutional law included.'
178
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The observations collected above warrant several conclusions.
It is unquestionable that the traditional clear-cut split between the
monistic and dualistic visions of the international and domestic le-
gal systems' mutual relations is largely obsolete. While the view of
the world from international perspective is still quite monistic, the
decline of dualism at the domestic forum is clear and the global
legal fabric is more pluralistic than monistic or dualistic.
In accordance with the article's leading argument, well-estab-
lished presence of the elements of international law in most of the
domestic legal systems effected the status of the Constitutions as
the countries' supreme acts. In spite of the inclination of the courts
in most of the countries to confirm the Constitution's prevailing
position in conflicts with any other (international or domestic) ele-
ments of the municipal system, the opinio juris clearly worked out
several meaningful arguments pointing out that the concept of the
constitutional supremacy is indeed in decline. As this article
shows, in the United States, both the jurisprudence and opinio juris
faced problems to determine the position of customary interna-
tional law within the law of the country. The status of customary
international law as the lowest (lower than the statutes and inter-
national agreements) component of the supreme law does not find
any convincing support on the ground of the constitutional con-
struction. Its recognition, however, as an element of the supreme
law of the land equal to the others and subject to the rule "last-in-
time" might and most likely would undermine the position of the
Constitution as the highest and all-prevailing law of the land.
The emergence of the supranational entities, such as the Euro-
pean Community, opened the Pandora's box of arguments pointing
to the changing role of the constitutions of the Member states. It is
178 Id. at 221.
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quite clear that from the perspective of the Community, the princi-
ple of supremacy of its law rules out the recognition of the
supremacy of any components of the domestic legal system Consti-
tutions including. The coherent and well-integrated legal system
cannot digest the concept of more than one supreme element. The
claims that the Member states preserved the remnants of their sov-
ereign rights and that the institutions of the Community have only
as much competence as was granted to them by the sovereign com-
ponents of the union are not convincing. In the situation in which
the Constitutions of all Member states were either amended or left
flexible enough to accommodate the principle of the supremacy of
Community law, the argument that they are still the supreme laws
of these countries cannot bring us too far.
The status of the Constitutions in the new East-Central Euro-
pean democracies is not much different. Some countries already
drafted their Constitutions in a way which would let them easily
incorporate the principle of supremacy of supranational law; some
others recognized the prevailing position of international law, in-
cluding the elements of customary international law, in their na-
tional legal systems. As I tried to claim above, both tendencies
result in the creation of the web of interdependencies, which might
undermine the supreme position of the Constitution.
Professor Gelber in his "Sovereignty Through Interdepen-
dence" claimed that "the record does not suggest that interdepen-
dence need represent a loss of power or even independence."' 17 9 I
agree with the first part of this statement. It is highly possible that
the state, cooperating and even dependent from other political en-
tities, may be more powerful than one left alone. Interdependence,
however, very rarely means equal mutual dependence. In fact, in
most of the cases it means the situation in which decision-making
process is highly determined or conditioned by the factors laying
beyond the state's control. It results in the abatement of self-gov-
erning and controling qualities of the state. The process does not
signify the loss of independence or sovereignty; it signifies, how-
ever, the replacement of the full independence by interdependence
and the concept of absolute by limited sovereignty. From constitu-
tional point of view it means the changing role of the constitutional
act, from the supreme law to the law basic or fundamental in its
179 Gelber, supra note 34, at 231.
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character but not clearly the highest or prevailing in the conflict
with all other elements of the countries' increasingly globalized le-
gal systems.
